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I. Introduction
Over the last four decades, the United States government has restricted its citi-
zens from investing in Cuba. The policy of prohibiting investment in Cuba, when first
implemented, served as a legitimate response to the expropriation of U.S. assets by the
Cuban government during 1959 and 1960.' Through the passage of time, however, the
1. In response to the nationalization of assets owned by U.S. investors in Cuba during 1959
and 1960, an extensive embargo was placed by the United States on Cuba. This first embargo
effort led to additional actions, now existing in statutory form. See MICHAEL W. GORDON,
THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS: THE DEMISE OF FOREIGN PRIVATE PROPERTY 104 (1976)
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investment restrictions (as embodied today in the Helms-Burton Act 2) have proven inef-
fective in their ultimate goals, and thus deserve rethinking.
Now is an especially appropriate time to consider the lifting of investment restric-
tions in Cuba. Felipe Prez Roque, the Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced
before the United Nations General Assembly in November 2001 that Cuba is willing to
negotiate a "fair and honorable" compensation arrangement for those U.S. companies
and citizens whose property was expropriated.3 Although such negotiations would nec-
essarily require the United States to take into account the effects of its embargo and
investment restrictions upon Cuba, the step toward open dialogue on the matter of
reparations is a positive sign of potential movement in the diplomatic stalemate.4
After providing an initial overview of foreign direct investment, this paper discusses
the history of investment relations between the United States and Cuba.' The paper then
(citing N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1960, at 1, col.7). Gordon goes on to state:
This action, overshadowed in light of the nationalizations, was the important beginning of a United
States led economic boycott of Cuba. Although thought by many United States government officials
to be the prelude to an economic and ultimately political collapse of Castro, history has evidenced
otherwise.
Id. at 104 n. 112.
2. Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act, 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6021-6091 (West
Supp. 2002) [hereinafter Helms-Burton Act].
3. On November 27, 2001, H.E. Mr. Felipe Prez Roque made a statement before the fifty-
sixth session (64th plenary meeting) of the General Assembly of the United Nations to
introduce Draft Resolution A/56/L.9 entitled, "Necessity of ending the economic, commercial
and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba.' See JOURNAL
OF THE UNITED NATIONS: PROGRAMME OF MEETINGS AND AGENDA SCHEDULED MEETINGS,
U.N. General Assembly, 56th Sess., Agenda Item 34, U.N. Doc. 2001/231 (Nov. 28, 2001).
The resolution was adopted after being passed by 167 votes to 3, with 3 abstentions. Id. The
applicable excerpt of Mr. Roque's statement follows in endnote 4, infra.
4. While identifying several action items as being necessary preludes to the lifting of the embargo
against Cuba, Mr. Roque stated it would be necessary for the United States:
To negotiate with Cuba a fair and honorable arrangement to provide compensation for the nearly
6,000 U.S. companies and citizens whose properties were nationalized in the first years of the
Revolution, as part of a sovereign step essential for the country's socio-economic development. It
was, in fact, the blockade that prevented the U.S. citizens from receiving the relevant compensation.
Cuba recognizes their rights-and would be wiling to reach an agreement that also takes into
account the extremely burdensome economic, and human hardships inflicted on our country by
the blockade.
See Statement Delivered by H.E. Mr. Felipe Perez Roque, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Cuba, to Introduce the Draft Resolution on the "Necessity of Ending the Economic,
Commercial and Financial Embargo Imposed by the United States of America against Cuba,"
Under Agenda Item 34 of the Fifty-Sixth Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Nov.
27, 2001) http://www.iacenter.org/cubaunl20l.htm (last visited Dec. 21, 2001).
5. The scope of any discussion addressing relations between Cuba and the United States could
encompass many topics. Recognizing this, this paper specifically limits its analysis to the role
that foreign direct investment has played (and continues to play) in the sovereign relationship
between the countries at issue.
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analyzes the current status of restrictions placed by the United States upon direct invest-
ment in Cuba, determining that efforts to relax investment restrictions are proper for the
following reasons: (1) the current U.S. policies promote punitive rather than compen-
satory ends; (2) the restrictions have failed to work a change in Cuban leadership; (3)
diplomatically, the restrictions have proven counterproductive by serving to create ten-
sion with U.S. allies; (4) the original "evil" to which the U.S. investment restrictions were
aimed (expropriation of U.S.-held assets without compensation) is unlikely to be wholly
corrected in light of the passage of time; and (5) the reintroduction of foreign direct
investment flows between the United States and Cuba should assist the development of
both countries.
Recognizing the mutual benefit available to states permitting the flow of foreign
direct investment, the determination is reached that a reasoned approach to reducing,
and ultimately ending, the investment restrictions is appropriate. By concluding the paper
with a list of alternative ways to relax the current investment restrictions, the author
writes with the hope of furthering discussions concerning U.S. financial policy regarding
Cuba.
II. General Overview of the Role that Foreign Direct
Investment Plays in Sovereign Relations
Following the rise to power in Cuba by Fidel Castro's government, foreign investors
in the island nation found their assets expropriated. More recently, though, Cuba has
been actively seeking foreign direct investment in order to promote development and fill
the economic void caused by the cessation of Cold War subsidies. Even so, the prohibition
on investment imposed by the United States has chilled capital input from international
investors, while completely barring investment from would-be investors in the United
States. Before discussing whether this chilling effect promotes the ultimate goals of the
United States, however, the role that foreign direct investment plays in sovereign relations
should be examined.
Generally speaking, foreign direct investment "occurs when a firm invests directly in
facilities to produce and/or market a product in a foreign country."'6 Private-sector enti-
ties or individuals typically make this type of investment with an equitable profit motive
distinct from portfolio investment. As such, during the foreign direct investment process,
the private investor must address both (1) the private-sector business concerns relating
to the project, and (2) the governmental/regulatory procedures that are established in
the home and host countries.7
6. CHARLES W. HILL, INTERNATIONAL BusINESS: COMPETING IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE
182 (3rd ed. 2002).
7. It is important to distinguish between foreign direct investment and either governmental aid,
or portfolio investment. Foreign direct investment, as opposed to governmental aid, comes
from the private sector (or entities acting in their private capacity), and represents a true
investment with the risk-reward potential for profits and/or losses. Foreign direct investment
should also be distinguished from portfolio investment, which is "investment by individuals,
firms, or public bodies (e.g., national and local governments) in foreign financial instruments
(e.g., government bonds, foreign stocks)." Id at 182 (recognizing that "[foreign portfolio
investment] does not involve taking a significant equity stake in a foreign business entity.').
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The regulatory scheme that a country adopts to address the in-and-out transfer of
foreign direct investment money depends upon the way in which the state views the
propriety of foreign direct investment. Professor M. Sornarajah has grouped the the-
ories addressing foreign direct investment into three theoretical categories that prove
useful for analytical purposes: the classical theory, the dependency theory, and the mid-
dle path.' The classical theory proposes "foreign investment is wholly beneficial to the
host" economy.9 The dependency theory, in direct contrast, proposes "foreign investment
will not bring about meaningful economic development," by arguing that foreign direct
investment creates a dependency on the actors of developing countries, which cannot
be overcome unless the ties created by foreign direct investment are broken.'0 The mid-
dle path recognizes that foreign direct investment brings both positives and negatives
and as such, the potential harms" accompanying activities of foreign investors in a host
8. M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 38 (Cambridge Univ.
Press 1994).
9. Id. Sornarajah goes on to state:
There are several factors which are relied on to support this view. The fact that foreign capital is
brought into a host state ensures that domestic capital available for use could be diverted to other
uses of public benefit. The foreign investor usually brings with him technology which is not available
in the host state, and this leads to the diffusion of technology within the host economy. There is
new employment created, whereas, without foreign investment such opportunity for employment
would have been lost. The labor that is so employed will acquire new skills associated with the
technology which the foreign investor brings with him. Skills in the management of large projects
will also be transferred to local personnel. Infrastructure facilities will be built, either by the foreign
investor, or for the foreign investor, by the state and these facilities will be to the general benefit
of the economy. The upgrading of facilities such as transport, health, or education to benefit the
foreign investor will enure to the benefit of the society as a whole.
Id. at 38-39.
10. Id. at 43. Sornarajah continues:
The [dependency] theory focuses on the fact that most investment is made by multinational corpo-
rations which are headquartered in the developed countries, and which operate through subsidiaries
in the developing countries. The proposition is that the multinational devises a global policy in the
interest of its parent company, and its shareholders in the home country. As a result, the network
of multinational corporations comes to serve the interests of the developed states in which they
have their headquarters. The home states become the central economies of the world, and the states
of the developing world become subservient, or peripheral economies serving the interests of the
central economies of the home states of the multinationals.
Id.
11. Id. at 46-47. The harmful effects identified by adherents to the middle path, and which
require regulation by the host country, are taken from various economic studies. The harmful
effects include: (1) the use of transfer pricing to avoid taxes, and (2) abuses associated
with the transfer of technology. Transfer pricing practices involve "fixing an artificially high
price for an item permitted to be imported at concessionary rates bought from the parent
company. Tax credits [are] later claimed on the basis of this artificial price." Id. at 47. With
regard to technology transfers, restrictions on the use of technology often serve to prevent its
dissemination, and at times the transferred technology is actually outdated or even hazardous.
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economy, should be identified and regulated with the goal of minimizing the harms
while permitting the investment positives to continue.
In addressing the history of investment relations between the United States and
Cuba, Cuba strictly adhered to the dependency theory as justification for its large-scale
expropriation of assets between 1959-1960. Such a theoretical approach to foreign invest-
ment directly collided with United States's application as a developed country of the
classical theory. 2 It is interesting to note, however, that following the demise of the Cold
War, Cuba's theoretical approach to foreign investment became much more aligned with
the middle path.
III. History of Investment Relations between
the United States and Cuba
From colonial times, the geographic proximity of Cuba off what would be the south-
eastern coast of the United States, naturally led to close economic relations between the
two eventually sovereign states.13 Following Cuban independence from Spain on Decem-
ber 10, 1898, investment in Cuba by U.S. business interests increased substantially. In
fact, "after the revolution the value of United States investment in Cuba had increased by
12. The United States arguably follows the free-market/classical theory of direct investment, as
tinged by pragmatic-nationalism. While the export of investment income is unfettered in
most instances, the United States may restrict foreign direct investment for national-security
reasons. See Karla D. Whalen. Exon-Florio and Open Investment: Are They at Odds in a
World Where National Security No Longer Revolves Solely Around Military Might? 17 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 59 (1994).
13. By the early 1800s, Cuba had developed into a sugar monoculture, attracting the attention
of moneyed interests in the United States who were looking for business opportunities. See
GORDON, supra note 1, at 3-4. In fact, the attraction was so strong that while Cuba was a
Spanish colony, serious discussions were had in the United States about annexing Cuba: in
1783 John Adams, the second U.S. President, "indicated that Cuba was America's natural
extension" and in 1825 his son (and eventual sixth U.S. President) John Quincy Adams, while
acting as President James Monroe's Secretary of State, "insisted it was a law of nature that
Cuba would one day 'gravitate only to the North American Union."' PETER SCHWAB, CUBA:
CONFRONTING THE U.S. EMBARGO vii (1999).
At least two negotiation rounds took place between the United States and Spain for the
purchase of Cuba. "President Buchanan offered to purchase Cuba for $100 million, rejected
due to Spanish pride and relationships with England and France." GORDON, supra note 1, at
4 (citing A. WEINBERG, MANIFEST DESTINY 205-210 (1935)). "A new round of negotiations
for the purchase of Cuba began in 1853, with overtones that the United States had adopted
a more militaristic attitude toward Spain's continued domination of Cuba:' Id.
Following the American Civil War, United States capital bolstered sugar production in
Cuba and strengthened Cuba's economic ties with the United States; before Spain curtailed
trade between Cuba and the United States for political reasons in the mid-1890s, Cuba
accounted for about one-fourth of United States' world trade. See Id. at 5. Professor Michael
Gordon proposes that U.S. investors interested in protecting their commercial interests, were
a large political force behind the timing and actions of the United States in the Spanish
American War, which led to recognition by Spain of Cuba's independence on December 10,
1898. See Id. at 7.
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1925 from $50 to $265 million, nearly displacing European capital as the leading source
of foreign investment."" Foreign direct investment by U.S. interests in Cuba continued
through the 1920s,"5 and although it dipped during the Great Depression, 16 by 1956,
direct investment from U.S. investors is estimated to have been $774 million (third in
the Americas behind investment in Venezuela and Brazil). 17
On New Year's Eve 1958, however, the investment relationship between the United
States and Cuba changed when the revolutionist movement led by Fidel Castro assumed
control of the Cuban government. A trickle of expropriation acts in 1959 aimed largely
at U.S. interests 8 turned into unfettered nationalization of assets in October 1960, when
Cuba adopted Laws 890 and 891, nationalizing foreign investments and key private
enterprises in accordance with newly adopted socialist principles initiated by the Castro
regime.' 9 These socialist principles were set out in the Cuban Constitution at article 1,
declaring Cuba to be a "socialist state of workers," and at article 5, stating that "the Com-
munist Party of Cuba... organizes. .. and guides ... the common efforts aimed at the
highest goals of the construction of socialism and advancement toward the communist
society."20
Although the socialist ideals adopted by Castro's government were directly supported
through economic aid and positively balanced trade from the Soviet Union between 1959
14, Id. at 16.
15. See id. at 19 (stating that "48.4 percent of Cuban sugar produced by United States owned
mills in 1920, approached 75 percent by 1929. There also occurred an increase in electric
power domination by the American and Foreign Power Company, and the growth of large
United States owned banking branches .... Cuba was undergoing a transformation into one
of the many profit-making sectors of publicly owned United States corporations.").
16. One author on FDI in Latin America has stated:
With the onset of the Great Depression, investments in Latin America declined drastically. Funds
were repatriated, reinvestment and new investment dried up, holdings were considerably devalued
to fit new monetary standards and last, but not least, the Latin American republics themselves
adopted economic controls, and nationalistic policies which effectively repulsed investors. Not until
after 1945 did new capital enter Latin America, and most of that came from the United States.
MARVIN D. BERNSTEIN, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: CASES AND ATTITUDES 11
(Alfred A. Konopf 1966).
17. GORDON, supra note 1, at 64 ns. 79-80 (citing U.S. Investments in the Latin American
Economy, U.S. Department of Commerce (1957)).
18. See id. at 84 n. 54 ("It has been estimated that in 1959 alone, the government had seized
property belonging to more than 5,000 individuals and more than 500 companies. Nearly
all of the seizures in 1959 had been based either on the Agrarian Reform Law, or the law to
recover stolen property.") (citations omitted).
19. See Venera A. Gallousis, Note, Cuba's Flirtatious Love Affair with Foreign Investment: the
Evolution of Laws 50 and 77, 5 TEX. HISPANIC J.L. & PoL'y 81, 84 (Spring 2001) (cit-
ing Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, The 1982 Cuban Joint Venture Law 8 (1985)). The enactment of
this new Cuban legislation meant that "[t]he nationalizations were no longer discriminatory
acts toward the United States, they were now part of a complete elimination of foreign and
domestic owned private investment, in all but the smallest businesses.' GORDON, supra note
1, at 103.




and 1989, the aid ended with the demise of the Soviet Union.2 Cuba's loss of economic
aid from Cold War alliances struck the Cuban economy hard.
The collapse of communism in Europe brought about a steep decline in the Cuban economy,
which was dependent on the subsidies Cuba received from the Soviet Union, and on Cuba's
advantageous trade with the nations of the Soviet bloc. Cuba's economic output declined by
50 percent between 1989 and 1993. During that period, the country's exports declined by 70
percent, imports dropped by 80 percent, and the gross domestic product decreased by about
40 percent.
22
Possibly foreseeing the decline in aid, Cuba began taking steps in the 1980s to wean
its reliance on the Soviet system and court international investment. In 1982, Cuba
enacted Decree-Law No. 50 On Economic Association Between Cuba and Foreign Entities
(Law 50).23 Law 50 permitted the creation of joint ventures, with up to 49 percent foreign
ownership,24 but generally proved unsuccessful in attracting foreign investment due in
part to continuing restrictions on the ownership of private property.
25
Thus, in September 1995, Cuba repealed Law 50 and enacted a new foreign invest-
ment code via Decree-Law No. 77 Presentation of the Law on Foreign Investment (Law
77).26 Law 77 only slightly modified the labor provisions enacted in Law 50.27 It signif-
icantly bolstered, however, the provisions for foreign investment, including the recogni-
tion of private property and permitting 100 percent foreign capital companies.2 1
21. See id. at 86 (citing ANA JULIA JATAR-HAUSMAN, THE CUBAN WAY: CAPITALISM, COMMUNISM
AND CONFRONTATION 45 (1999)).
22. MATIAS F. TRAVIESO-DIAz, THE LAWS AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF A FREE-MARKET CUBA-A
PROSPECTIVE FOR BUSINESS 2 (1997) [hereinafter TRAVIEso-DIAz PROSPECTIVE] (citations
omitted).
23. See Gallousis, supra note 19, at 82 & 87 (citing Decreto-Ley Numero 50 Sobre Asociacion
Economica Entre Entidades Cubanos y Extranjeras, reprinted in Jaime Suchlicki & Antonio
Jorge, Investing in Cuba: Problems and Prospects 115 app. 1, at 115-26 (1994)).
24. As stated by Gallousis, the investment approach selected by Cuba via Law 50 was guarded:
Joint Ventures. .. had to meet certain nonnegotiable terms. They had to be domiciled in Cuba, of
a temporary duration, and subject to the same regulations that applied to domestic corporations.
In relation to the labor system, joint ventures had to employ Cuban workers, except in certain
management, technical and highly skilled positions where foreigners readily had the necessary skills.
However, they could not fire Cuban workers directly. A Cuban entity hired the workers, and in
return for a fee, contracted with the foreign investment entity to provide the workforce. Regarding
taxation, joint ventures were taxed 30 percent on net profits and 25 percent on Cuban personnel's
payroll, which included social security contributions.
Gallousis, supra note 19, at 88 (citations omitted).
25. See id. at 92.
26. Id. at 82 & 94 (citing CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA art. 18, Presentation of the
Law on Foreign Investment, Decree-Law No. 77 (Sept. 4, 1995)).
27. "Law 77's labor provisions retain the requirement that foreign investors must hire Cuban
workers with limited exceptions, and investors must still contract Cuban employees through
a Cuban agency." Gallousis, supra note 19, at 95.
28. See id.
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Under article 12 of Law 77, foreign investment in Cuba can now be made in one of
the following forms: as part of a joint venture, via an international economic association
contract, or through an entirely foreign capital company.29 Before an investment may be
made, however, it must first be authorized. As one commentator states:
A foreign investment must be authorized by the Executive Committee of the Council of Min-
isters, or a Commission of the Executive Committee which will issue a resolution approving
the foreign investment. There is no prescribed format dictating the contents of the resolu-
tion, and its contents are therefore, the result of negotiation between the parties to the joint
enterprise and the government.
30
Thus, discretionary control over investment remains in the hands of the Cuban govern-
ment.3 1
The United States's response to Cuba's mass expropriation of assets was the institu-
tion of an economic embargo in 1960, as ordered by President Dwight D. Eisenhower.
32
President John F. Kennedy subsequently reinforced Eisenhower's efforts.33 The embargo
was justified under the statutory auspices of the Trading with the Enemy Act34 and the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.35 Subsequently, all foreign direct investment in Cuba
by "persons within the United States" was barred on 12:01 a.m. e.s.t., July 8, 1963.36
This complete prohibition on investment, formalizing and extending the embargo pre-
viously affected by executive order, was enacted as part of the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations.
37
29. See ROBERTO BRIER RIVERO, LEGAL PROFILE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CUBA: 90 QUES-
TIONS 59-60 (2nd ed. 1996) (taken from response to Question 1.1: "What types of foreign
investment are permitted in Cuba?").
30. Id. at 60-61 (taken from response to Question 1.3: "What authorizations/registrations are
required for a foreign investment?").
31. The enactment of Laws 50 and 77 by Cuba were intended to bring in foreign money while
limiting foreign influence. In sum, the government of Cuba "wanted an isolated enclave of
foreign investment and tourism, which could provide the hard currency and resources needed
to maintain the rest of the social structure unchanged.' See Gallousis, supra note 19, at 86.
32. See PATRICK J. KIGER, SQUEEZE PLAY: THE UNITED STATES, CUBA AND THE HELMS-BURTON
ACT 20 (1997).
33. See Digna B. French, Economic Sanctions Imposed by the United States Against Cuba: The
Thirty-Nine Year Old Embargo Culminating with the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 7 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 1, (1999).
34. 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 1 (West 1990).
35. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370 (West 1990 & Supp. 2002); See Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31
C.F.R. 515.101 (1985). See also Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Practitioner's Note: So, Your Client
Wants To Go To Havana .... 6 NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. AM. 277, 281 (Spring 2000) (recog-
nizing that the embargo in its current form (after enactment of the Helms-Burton Act) is
founded on three statutes: the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, the Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, and the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992) [hereinafter Travieso-Diaz Article].




Interestingly, the United States waited nearly three decades to state, in codified form,
a policy rationale for the embargo. 8 In 1992 the United States set forth its "Statement
of Policy" toward Cuba, via enactment of the Cuban Democracy Act, which states, "[i]t
should be the policy of the United States ... to seek a peaceful transition to democracy
and a resumption of economic growth in Cuba through the careful application of sanc-
tions directed at the Castro government and support for the Cuban people.'3 9 Through
the Cuban Democracy Act, Congress also did the following: empowered the President
to apply limited sanctions to any country assisting the Cuban government;4" stated that
"[tihe President should encourage the governments of countries that conduct trade with
Cuba to restrict their trade and credit relations with Cuba;"'" provided for the limited
export of food, medicines, and medical supplies to Cuba;42 and set out foreign relation
policies for potential transitional and democratic governments in Cuba.43
Four years after passage of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, the investment pro-
hibitions in effect in the United States were codified and extraterritorially extended by
Congress, with the passage of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad)
Act, otherwise known as the Helms-Burton Act.44 It is worth commenting that the pas-
sage of the Helms-Burton Act is generally agreed to have been, in large part, a response to
Cuba's shooting down of two civilian aircraft piloted by Florida residents on February 24,
199641-the Helms-Burton Act became law less than three weeks later on March 12, 1996.
IV. Overview of the Helms-Burton Act
Until passage of the Helms-Burton Act, the prohibition of investment in Cuba (as
imposed by the United States) was effected only by Regulation. 46 Although the Helms-
Burton Act did little to change the pre-existing investment restrictions on U.S. nationals,
38. As recognized by Professor Irving Louis Horowitz, the consecration of the embargo policy
"took place rather late in the policy game, so that the de jure policy came considerably after
the de facto state of conflict that exists between the United Sates and Cuba." Irving Louis
Horowitz, Ethical and Political Consequences of the American Embargo of Cuba, in INVESTING
IN CUBA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 2-3 (Jaime Suchlicki & Antonio Jorge eds., 1994).
39. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C.A §§ 6001-6010 (West Supp. 2002). Id. § 6002.
40. See id. § 6003(a).
41. See id.
42. See id. § 6004.
43. See id. §§ 6006-6007.
44. The Helms-Burton Act is codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091. Notably the Helms-Burton Act
has several consequences, but in accordance with the scope of this paper, the discussion will
be limited to analyzing the investment aspects of the Act.
45. See Helms-Burton Act. See also Seymour J. Rubin, Introductory Note-Organization of Ameri-
can States: Inter-American Juridical Committee Opinion Examining the U.S. Helms-Burton Act,
35 I.L.M. 1322 (1996) ("[The Helms-Burton Act], generally thought to have been occasioned
by the shooting down by Cuban aircraft of two civilian airplanes flown by anti-Castro Florida
residents, aroused a storm of international controversy, centering on issues of extraterritori-
ality, and of alleged United States treaty commitment violations.") thereinafter Organization
of American States].
46. See generally, Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. 515 (1963).
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it drew international attention and criticism for taking an additional enforcement step
intended to create penalties against persons, regardless of nationality, trafficking in con-
fiscated property.47
Contained within the purposes of the Helms-Burton Act are the following goals: (1)
"to assist the Cuban people in regaining their freedom and prosperity," (2) "to strengthen
international sanctions against the Castro government," (3) "to provide for the continued
national security of the United States in the face of continuing threats from the Castro
government" (4) "to encourage the holding of free and democratic elections in Cuba;'
(5) "to provide a policy framework for United States support to the Cuban people
in response to the formation of a transition government or a democratically elected
government in Cuba," and (6) "to protect United States nationals against confiscatory
takings and the wrongful trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro regime "'48
The Helms-Burton Act has four statutory parts. Title 1'9 aims to strengthen inter-
national sanctions against Cuba. Title 115 is intended "to [assist] a free and independent
Cuba." Title III" enacts provisions to protect the property rights of U.S. nationals who
had property expropriated in Cuba. Title IV,5  likewise, provides for exclusion from the
United States of aliens who have confiscated property of U.S. nationals, or who traffic
in such property. Directly pertinent to foreign investment in Cuba are portions of Titles
II, III, and IV.
In Title II of the Helms-Burton Act, section 6033 restricts the extension of a "loan,
credit, or other financing" by U.S. nationals to "any person for the purpose of financing
transactions involving any confiscated property, the claim to which is owned by a United
States national as of March 12, 1996;' unless the financing is accorded to the United
States national owning the claim.53 This prohibition limits itself to U.S. nationals and,
in essence, simply restates the investment prohibition already in effect via regulation.
Titles III and IV of the Helms-Burton Act extend the regulatory prohibition on
investment activity (which by regulation had been directed at U.S. nationals) to the
investment activities of those outside the United States. Title III creates a cause of action,
whereby a U.S. national who owned property expropriated by the Cuban government on
or after January 1, 1959, may seek treble damages 54 against "any person" that "traffics"
47. See Helms-Burton Act.
48. Id. § 6022.
49. Id. §§ 6031-6046.
50. Id. §§ 6061-6067.
51. Id. §§ 6081-6091.
52. Id. § 6091.
53. Id. § 6033.
54. Damages (before trebled) are the sum of court costs, reasonable attorney's fees, and the
greater of:
the amount, if any, certified to the claimant by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission under
the International Claims Settlement Act of 1949, plus interest... or the fair market value of that
property, calculated as being either the current value of the property, or the value of the property
when confiscated plus interest, whichever is greater.
Id. § 6082(a)(1)(1).
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in such property."5 The definition of one who "traffics"56 in confiscated property is
extremely broad, and would seem to encompass almost all activities in which a foreign
investor might engage concerning Cuban property.5 7 Discretion to suspend the effective
date for creation of the cause of action (via successive 6 month suspension periods) was
provided to the president.5" To date, the effectiveness of the cause of action has been
suspended, preventing the initiation of lawsuits.5 9
Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act directs that foreign nationals who have confis-
cated, converted, or trafficked in the confiscated property of a U.S. national are to be
denied entry into the United States. 60 If a foreign corporate entity is deemed to have
confiscated, converted, or trafficked in confiscated property, then its directors, officers,
and controlling shareholders may also be denied entry into the United States.6' Unlike
the suspension of the retributive actions provided in Title III of the Helms-Burton Act,
Title IV became effective on March 12, 199662 and has been applied to deny certain
aliens entry into the United States.63
The Helms-Burton Act has been criticized, particularly with regard to Title III, for [c]onfusing
a claim for damages or restitution, based on nationalization, with an action in rem to claim
wrongfully 'confiscated property' and in addition with an action in personam for unjust
enrichment from the use of such wrongfully 'confiscated property' by any person subsequently
involved in such use in a broad-ranging and indeterminate manner.
64
55. Id. § 6082.
56. A person traffics in confiscated property if that person knowingly and intentionally-(i)(l) trans-
fers, distributes, dispenses, brokers, or otherwise disposes of confiscated property; (II) purchases,
receives, obtains control of, or otherwise acquires confiscated property; or (Ili) improves (other
than for routine maintenance), invests in (by contribution of funds or anything of value, other than
for routine maintenance), or begins after March 12, 1996, to manage, lease, possess, use, or hold
an interest in confiscated property; (ii) enters into a commercial arrangement using or otherwise
benefiting from confiscated property; or (iii) causes, directs, participates in, or profits from, traf-
ficking (as described in clause (i) or (ii)) by another person, or otherwise engages in trafficking (as
described in clause (i) or (ii)) through another person, without the authorization of any United
States national who holds a claim to the property.
Id. § 6091(b)(2)(A).
57. Notably, the definition of traffics does not include "transactions and uses of property inci-
dent to lawful travel to Cuba, to the extent that such transactions and uses of property are
necessary to the conduct of such travel." Id. § 6091(b)(2)(B)(iii).
58. See id. § 6085.
59. See generally, Jorge F. Perez-Lopez & Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, The Helms-Burton Law and Its
Antidotes: A Classic Standoff? 7 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 95, 105-6 (2000).
60. See Helms-Burton Act § 6091.
61. See id. § 6091(a)(3).
62. See id. § 6091(d).
63. For example, in 1996, eleven executives from Sherritt International Corporation, a Canadian
Mining entity, were barred entrance into the United States because of the Company's activities
in Cuba. See Merrill Goozner, U.S. Law Fails to Scare Canada Firms Out of Cuba: Helms-
Burton Act Ignored as Trade Between 2 Picks Up, Cm. TRIB., June 16, 1997, at 4.
64. Organization of American States, supra note 45, at 1331 J 4 (g) (1996).
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However, the Helms-Burton Act did not inadvertently move from mere restitution
demands (to be brought by a state on behalf of its citizens) to the creation of individual
causes of action against property or third parties. As stated in the act itself, one purpose
of the legislation was to "protect United States nationals against confiscatory takings
and the wrongful trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro regime "' 65 Congress
wanted to chill investment in Cuba from all sources by exposing investors to a biting
liability scheme and a disruptive border-crossing policy.
66
The timing of the Helms-Burton Act is noteworthy. In 1995, just a few years after
Cuba lost its economic aid from the Soviet Union, the Cuban government substantially
revamped its national investment law through passage of Law 77. As discussed above,
this new law was a progressive step built on prior efforts (i.e., Law 50) to move Cuba
away from the radical theories of foreign direct investment6 7 followed during the mass
expropriations of 1960. In essence, Cuba was moving from a period highlighted by the
nationalization of assets, to a period where foreigners were being reinvited to have a more
active role in the Cuban economy. Despite this progress in Cuba, and even having seen
by example the devastation caused to socialist ideology when the economies of Eastern
Europe were opened to direct investment, Congress still passed the Helms-Burton Act in
March 1996 (just months after the enactment of Law 77 in Cuba). Instead of extending a
hand and proactively promoting the Cuban accessions toward a freer economy, Congress
threw down the proverbial gauntlet.
V. International Reaction to the Helms-Burton Act
The passage of the Helms-Burton Act served to statutorily reiterate the U.S. ban on
direct investment in Cuba. The Helms-Burton Act, however, went one step further by
proactively establishing a framework to chill investment from non-U.S. nationals.6" It is
not an exaggeration to say that passage of the Helms-Burton Act by the United States
met almost universal opposition from international organizations and sovereign states.
The United Nations adopted ten resolutions in as many years recognizing the neces-
sity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United
States of America against Cuba.6 9 The most recent resolution continues the trend of
65. Helms-Burton Act at § 6022(6).
66. See generally id.
67. See General Overview of the Role that Foreign Direct Investment Plays in Sovereign Relations
supra Part II.
68. See Titles III and IV of the Helms-Burton Act discussion supra Part IV.
69. G.A. Res. 19, U.N. GAOR, 4 7th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/47/19 (1992); G.A. Res. 16, U.N. GAOR,
48th Sess. Agenda Item 30, U.N. Doc. A/48/16 (1993); G.A. Res. 9, U.N. GAOR, 4 9 th Sess.,
Agenda Item 24, U.N. Doc. A/49/9 (1994); G.A. Res. 10, U.N. GAOR, 5 0th Sess., Agenda Item
27, U.N. Doc. A/50/10 (1995); G.A. Res. 17, U.N. GAOR, 51" Sess., Agenda Item 27, U.N.
Doc. AJ51/17 (1996); G.A. Res. 34, U.N. GAOR, 5 2 nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/52/34 (1997); G.A.
Res. 4, U.N. GAOR, 53th Sess., Agenda Item 29, U.N. Doc. A/53/4 (1998); G.A. Res. 21, U.N.
GAOR, 54 h Sess., Agenda Item 33, U.N. Doc. A/54/21 (1999); G.A. Res. 20, U.N. GAOR,
55'h Sess., U.N. Doc. A/55/20 (2000); G.A. Res. 9, U.N. GAOR, 56'h Sess., Agenda Item 34,
U.N. Doc. A/56/9 (2001).
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specifically expressing concern
about the continued promulgation and application by Member States of laws and regula-
tions such as that promulgated on 12 March 1996 known as the "Helms-Burton Act," the
extraterritorial effects of which affect the sovereignty of other States, the legitimate interests
of entities or persons under their jurisdiction and the freedom of trade and navigation. 70
In the Western Hemisphere, the Organization of American States (OAS) likewise
reacted strongly to passage of the Helms-Burton Act.71 It is the opinion of the OAS that
the Helms-Burton Act "does not conform to international law" in eight respects:
a) The domestic courts of a claimant State are not the appropriate forum [sic] for
the resolution of State-to-State claims.
b) The claimant State does not have the right to espouse claims by persons who
were not its nationals at the time of injury.
c) The claimant State does not have the right to attribute liability to nationals of
third States for a claim against a foreign State.
d) The claimant State does not have the right to attribute liability to nationals of
third States for the use of expropriated property located in the territory of the
expropriating State, where such use conforms to the laws of this latter State, nor
for the use in the territory of third States of intangible property or products
that do not constitute the actual asset expropriated.
e) The claimant State does not have the right to impose liability on third parties
not involved in a nationalization through the creation of liability not linked to
the nationalization, or unrecognized by the international law on this subject,
thus modifying the juridical bases for liability.
f) The claimant State does not have the right to impose compensation in any
amount greater than the effective damage, including interest, that results from
the alleged wrongful act of the expropriating State.
g) The claimant State may not deprive a foreign national of the right, in accordance
with due process of law, to effectively contest the bases and the quantum of
claims that may affect his property.
h) Successful enforcement of such a claim against the property of nationals of a
third State, in a manner contrary to the norms of international law, could itself
constitute a measure tantamount to expropriation and result in responsibility
of the claimant State.72
70. See Necessity of Ending the Economic, Commercial and Financial Embargo Imposed by the
United States of America Against Cuba, G.A. Res. 34, U.N. GAOR, 5 6 th Sess., Agenda Item -'
at Preamble, U.N. Doc. A/56/9 (2001).
71. "The General Assembly Resolution [of the OAS]-with the U.S. in solitary dissent-was
unusually vigorous. Ordinarily, the General Assembly would 'request' an opinion of the
Juridical Committee; in this case it 'directed' the Committee to formulate its opinion and to
do so 'as a matter of priority" This deviation from normal diplomatic delicacy of style may
have reflected considerable irritation at what may have been perceived as U.S. arrogance with
respect to the foreign policies of other sovereign states." Organization of American States,
supra note 45, at 1322.
72. Organization of American States, supra note 45, at 1332 5 6.
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On a multilateral level, the European Communities threatened to proceed with
dispute settlement procedures against the United States before the World Trade
Organization. Although these claims were eventually dropped through consultations
and negotiations, the political capital expended by the United States in the process was
significant.73
Following suit on the level of bilateral relations, there were strong reactions to the
Helms-Burton Act. Several governments went so far as to enact blocking statutes or
antitode laws in direct response to Helms-Burton.
Canada, Mexico, the European Union, and Argentina have all enacted 'blocking statutes'
intended to counteract not only the Helms-Burton Act but, more broadly, other foreign
legislation perceived to have extraterritorial reach. Spain reportedly considered enacting a
Helms-Burton antidote in the summer and fall of 1996, but did not follow through in view
of the anticipated joint action by the European Union.74
Arguably by inciting such strong international reaction to the Helms-Burton Act,
the United States shifted the world's indignation away from wrongful expropriations and
the Cuban democracy gap, instead raising questions about the overextension of U.S.
sovereignty rights. This has done little to inspire other nations to work together with the
United States in a common policy of addressing the Castro government in Cuba.
VI. Analysis of the Appropriateness and Effectiveness
of Existing Investment Restrictions
The Helms-Burton Act and the regulatory schemes predating it were a direct
response to the uncompensated expropriation by Cuba of substantial assets owned by
U.S. nationals. They were further justified as necessary to protect national security.7" In
analyzing the investment restrictions invoked by the United States as to Cuba, one must
take these motives into consideration, and ask whether the United States appropriately
instituted investment restrictions. One must also ask whether the investment restrictions
currently in place are effective in meeting U.S. policy goals.
A. APPROPRIATENESS OF THE UNITED STATES INVESTMENT RESTRICTIONS
The extent of Cuban expropriation with regard to U.S. nationals was tremendous:
Between 1959 and 1960, the government of Cuba seized properties belonging to United States
nationals with an estimated value of $1.8 billion. . . . This magnitude is greater than the
total amount expropriated by all other Communist countries combined, including the Soviet
73. See generally, Stefaan Smis & Kim Van der Borght, The EU-U.S. Compromise on the Helms-
Burton and D'Amato Acts, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 227 (1999).
74. Perez-Lopez & Travieso-Diaz, supra note 59, at 114-115 (citations omitted.)
75. See generally Helms-Burton Act § 6022 (including the goals of "protect[ing] United States
nationals against confiscatory takings and the wrongful trafficking in property confiscated
by the Castro regime" and of "provid[ing] for the continued national security of the United
States in the face of continuing threats from the Castro government").
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Union, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. Of this sum,
nearly $1.6 billion represents the certified claims of corporations; the value of properties taken
from individuals is estimated at $221 million.76
To date, U.S. nationals who had property expropriated have yet to be compensated.
Including interest, estimates of the current value of compensation claims held by U.S.
citizens approximate six billion.77
A taking by a sovereign nation may either be an unjustified confiscation without a
public purpose, or a nationalization for the public good. The nationalization for a public
good is a lawful taking under international law so long as it is not discriminatory."
The definition of public good is open-ended, though, permitting a sovereign leeway to
expropriate so long as it does so within the sovereign's public role.7 9
If a sovereign does expropriate property for a public purpose, it then has a duty
under international law to compensate the previous property holder."0 Admittedly, there
76. Eric N. Baklanoff, Praeger Special Studies in International Economics and Development,
EXPROPRIATION OF U.S. INVESTMENTS IN CUBA, MEXICO, AND CHILE 131 (1975).
77. With regard to U.S. assets expropriated by Cuba, one can look to the claims made before the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC) to estimate the value of the seized property
for which U.S. citizens and nationals are still awaiting compensation. Claims were brought
before the FCSC as part of the Cuban Claims Program, by which Congress authorized the
FCSC to determine the validity and amount of claims. See Travieso-Diaz Article, supra note
35, at 284-85 (citing the International Claims Settlement Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 1643 et seq. (1988)
(amended in 1994)). As summarized:
The Cuban Claims Program of the FCSC was active between 1966 and 1972. During that time, it
received 8,816 claims-1,146 by U.S. corporations and 7,670 by individual citizens. It certified 5,911
of those claims, with an aggregate amount of $1.8 billion; denied 1,195 claims, with an aggregate
amount of $1.5 billion; and dismissed without consideration, or saw withdrawn, 1,170 other claims.
The value of the certified Cuban claims exceeds the combined certified amounts of all other claims
validated by the FCSC for expropriation of U.S. nationals' assets by other countries. Of the $1.8
billion in certified claims, over 85 percent (about $1.58 billion) corresponded to 898 corporate
claimants, and the rest (about $220 million) was spread among 5,013 individual claimants. Although
the Cuban Claims Act did not expressly authorize the inclusion of interest in the amount allowed,
the FCSC determined that simple interest at a 6 percent rate should be included as part of the value
of the claims it certified. Applying such an interest rate on the outstanding $1.8 billion principal
yields a present value of about $6 billion. This amount does not include the value of the claims that
were disallowed for lack of adequate proof, nor those that were not submitted to the FCSC during
the period specified in the statute.
Id. at 285. Thus, strictly construing the prompt, adequate, and effective compensation require-
ments of international law (and permitting interest for the failure to comply promptly), U.S.
interests have claims amounting to approximately $6 billion.
78. Sornarajah, supra note 8, at 315 ("Taking of foreign property by a state is prima facie lawful.
Such legality is, however, conditional. The taking of foreign property will be lawful only if
such taking was for a public purpose and is not discriminatory.").
79. Id. at 316 ("It is generally conceded that the requirement of public purpose for a taking is
not much of a limitation in modern times.").
80. See id. at 315.
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is some dispute internationally as to the standard of compensation,8' although a con-
sensus is developing that the form of the compensation should fit into the all too
nondescript category of "prompt, adequate and effective." 2 Some also argue that the
expropriating state should permit the property owner administrative or judicial recourse
during the expropriation process.8 3
The expropriation of foreign assets by Cuba stands in violation of international
law, but this is clear only with respect to the failure by Cuba to provide compensation.
No apparent discrimination existed in the expropriation actions, as the nationalization
efforts affected nationals and foreigners (regardless of nationality) alike. The malleability
81. See id.
82. See Organization of American States, supra note 45, at 1331 15(a).
83. Generally speaking, international bodies and institutions agree with the above analysis. See
North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605, Art. 1110(1) (1993).
By way of further example, below are the principles and rules concerning expropriation as
interpreted and adopted by the Organization of American States:
a) Any state that expropriates, nationalizes, or takes measures tantamount to expropriation,
or nationalization of property owned by foreign nationals must respect the following
rules: such action must be for a public purpose, nondiscriminatory, and accompanied
by prompt, adequate and effective compensation, granting to the expropriated party
effective administrative or judicial review of the measure and quantum of compensation.
Failure to comply with these rules will entail State responsibility.
b) The obligation of a State in respect of its liability for acts of expropriation, consists of the
restitution of the asset expropriated or adequate compensation for the damage caused,
including interest up to the time of payment.
c) When a national of a foreign State is unable to obtain effective redress in accordance
with international law, the State of which it is a national may espouse the claim through
an official State-to-State claim. It is a condition for such espousal, that from the time
of the occurrence of the injury until the settlement of the claim, the holder thereof
must without interruption have been a national of the claimant State, and not have the
nationality of the expropriating State.
d) Claims against a State for expropriation of the property of foreign nationals cannot be
enforced against the property of private persons, except where such property is itself
the expropriated asset, and within the jurisdiction of the claimant State. Products grown
or produced on such property do not, under customary international law, constitute
expropriated property.
e) Any use by nationals of a third State of expropriated property located in the expropriating
State, where such use conforms to the laws of that State, as well as the use anywhere of
products or intangible property, not constituting the expropriated asset itself, does not
contravene any norm of international law.
f) The nationals of foreign States have the right to due process of law in all judicial or
administrative procedures that may affect their property. Due process includes the pos-
sibility of effectively contesting both the basis and quantum of the claim in a legal or
administrative proceeding.
Organization of American States, supra note 45, at 1331-32 5 5. The Juridical Committee
of the OAS deemed that the above-set forth "principles and rules are generally accepted by
the Member States" after considering "the rules of international law applicable to diplomatic
protection, State responsibility, and the minimum rights of aliens regarding the protection of
property rights of nationals' Id.
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of the public purpose requirement makes difficult to raise a successful challenge against
Cuba's sovereign determination that the nationalizations were for the public good. And,
although the international requirement that foreign investors facing expropriation be
accorded procedural recourse via the courts, or administrative action does not appear to
have been met, one can argue that the true purpose of the accommodation of procedural
rights is simply to ensure compensation, non-discrimination, and the existence of a
public purpose.
Because Cuba failed to provide "prompt, adequate and effective" compensation,
thus violating the international law on expropriations, one can solidly argue that the
investment restrictions imposed by the United States were "appropriate" as a tool of
sovereign pressure.14 This is especially so as to the initial regulatory prohibitions on
investment, which were largely restricted in scope to U.S. nationals, and which involved
a like retaliatory measure (restricting U.S. nationals from investing in Cuba because of
actions taken by the Cuban government against U.S. investors).
Taking the analysis one step further, however, one must ask whether the United
States's use of an investment prohibition policy to achieve (at least in part) the goal of
compensation for its nationals remains realistic after more than forty years. The hard
truth is that time has been on the side of Castro's government."5 From the perspective
of those whose property was expropriated, if any compensation is ever received, it will
probably never be adequate or effective.
Until recently, Cuba has unrelentingly refused to compensate investors suffering
losses caused by its expropriations. Even through recent statements in November 2001,
Cuba appears to be laying the groundwork to try and bargain away full monetary com-
pensation to U.S. investors, with alleged economic harms caused to the Cuban people by
the U.S. embargo. 6 Also worth mentioning, if the Castro government were replaced any-
time soon, it is unlikely that the Cuban treasury will be in a position to make adequate
84. Admittedly, some criticize the application of the embargo as a whole. See, e.g., supra notes
69-73 and accompanying text. Additionally, the validity of the Helms-Burton Act under
international law has also been attacked. See discussion supra Part V.
85. This point poses interesting and unresolved questions. For how long should a state continue
to be able to claim that its citizens are entitled to compensation for expropriated assets? Is
there, or should there be, a time bar (i.e., laches or a staleness period) to compensation
claims? These are difficult and vexing questions not answered here, but the author's observa-
tion is that at some point, a state should soften its stance in order to move on with positive
sovereign relations. What that time period should be is hard to say, but at some point all
the natural persons actually injured (or even their heirs) will have passed away, and all the
corporate persons still in existence will have written-off the losses without a realistic hope of
substantial recovery. At the same time, however, the author recognizes that a state should not
benefit, simply due to the running of an arbitrary time period, for uncompensated expropri-
ations.
86. As already discussed, in November of 2001, Cuba's Minister of Foreign Affairs recognized
the compensation rights of those United States citizens who had property nationalized. See
Statement of Mr. Felipe Perez Roque, supra note-4. This recognition was made during a
statement before the General Assembly of the United Nations, and although it represents
a huge concession by Cuba, it was made while Cuba also indicated that any agreement on
compensation would need to take "into account the extremely burdensome economic and
human hardships inflicted on [Cuba] by the blockade" Statement of Mr. Felipe Perez Roque,
supra note 4.
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and effective compensation, when faced with the daunting task of facilitating economic
growth. Thus, as will be discussed in Part VII, below, alternative approaches to effecting
compensation should be evaluated.
B. EFFECTIVENESS OF INVESTMENT RESTRICTIONS IN THE POLITICAL
AND SOCIAL REALMS
The United States's efforts to prohibit investment in Cuba initially, may have been
an appropriate response to the uncompensated expropriation of assets in 1959-1960, but
one must also remember that the policy rationale and objectives behind the investment
restrictions (both in their regulatory and statutory form), extend beyond the goal of
compensation. The embargo and accompanying prohibition on investment also were
established for the purposes of pressuring the Castro regime to permit Cuban citizens
additional freedoms, addressing the Communist foothold gained off the U.S. coast, and
ultimately driving the Castro government out of power.87 By restricting the flow of direct
investment into Cuba, however, the United States has also restricted the influence and
privatization-minded objectives that accompany direct investment money. Today Castro
remains in power, and there is no U.S. business presence on the island of Cuba.
The fact that U.S. imposed investment restrictions have chilled investment in Cuba
is indisputable. U.S. citizens are not permitted to invest in Cuba, a country that histor-
ically has been of significant importance to the economic development of the United
States.8 ' Moreover, economic data collected by the U.S. government, suggests that foreign
investment in Cuba was moderated by passage of the Helms-Burton Act in 1996:
Our efforts to discourage foreign investment in properties confiscated from United States
citizens have helped slow the pace of investment in Cuba. We monitor foreign investment
on the island carefully, as part of our effort to enforce the Libertad [a/k/a Helms-Burton]
Act enacted in March 1996. In doing so, we have developed estimates of the level and type
of foreign investment in Cuba. As of December, we estimate foreigners have invested $1.7
billion in Cuba since 1990. The largest sectors are telecommunications-with $650 million,
mining-with $350 million, and tourism-with $200 million. We estimate foreigners have
signed firm commitments to invest another $1.6 billion during the same period, of which
tourism-related projects account for $950 million. These numbers show relatively modest
growth since December 1995, when Cuban Vice President Carlos-Lage announced that Cuba
had received $2.1 billion in foreign investment, of which only half had been delivered. 9
Does this limited success at chilling some foreign investment justify the sacrificed costs?
The international political costs have been high for the United States. The world
community responded in uncharacteristically harsh diplomatic language to the Helms-
Burton Act, and acted in ways that led the United States to expend political capital
87. The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C.A § 6001, et seq. (West 1990 & Supp. 2002) sets
forth the policy behind the U.S. embargo and investment prohibition. See discussion supra
Part III.
88. See discussion of historical economic ties between the United States and Cuba supra Part III.
89. John R. Hamilton, Cuba: Economic Transition and U.S. Policy-Remarks on Mar. 25,
1999, available at: http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/us-cuba/hamil25.htm (last visited Oct. 4,
2001).
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and resources to prevent nations of the world from taking retributive action.9" Castro's
socialist regime remains in power, and investments are being made in Cuba, just not
from citizens of the United States.9 The logic of obtaining market share by being the
first into a market, which in this case is a market to be developed fully after the end
of the Castro regime, is not being followed. It would be one thing if the United States
could say to its nationals that no one else is investing, but the fact is that key sectors
likely to bring substantial investment by U.S. interests, namely tourism92 and mining,
are already seeing investor toeholds gained by foreign investors.93
Even a review of the spin placed on future U.S. investment in Cuba by the U.S. State
Department demonstrates that investment funds are available to readily flow into Cuba
upon the lifting of the economic restrictions:
We believe our efforts to help the Cuban people prepare for the inevitable transition are
working. When democracy and the free market do return to Cuba, the United States will
have an important economic role to play in the transition. In January 1997, an inter-agency
team submitted a report to Congress estimating that Cuba would receive some $4-8 billion
in external financial assistance from private and public sources during the first 6 years of
the transition. .. . We expect the American business community will find a democratic Cuba
attractive for several reasons. Besides its proximity to the United States, the country is rich
in physical and human resources. The reemergence of United States tourism offers significant
opportunities for growth.94
Logically, should it make economic sense to invest in Cuba, interests in the United States
will make investments if they are no longer barred by restrictions.
As discussed earlier, through the passage of Law 77 in 1995, Cuba made a progressive
step toward a legal regime that seeks to entice foreign investors with the implementation
of previously lacking investor safeguards. While hanging on to dependency ideology to
some extent, Cuba now also has one foot squarely within the "middle path" approach
90. See discussion of the international reaction to the Helms-Burton Act supra Part V.
91. See TRAVIEso-DIAz PROSPECTIVE, supra note 22 at 2 (recognizing that in the mid-1990s
major investments were announced and made in Cuba, "especially in the areas of mining
and tourism").
92. As reported by the U.S. Department of State:
In the mid 1990s, tourism surpassed sugar, long the mainstay of the Cuban economy, as the primary
source of foreign exchange. Tourism figures prominently in the Cuban Government's plans for
development, and a top official cast it as the "heart of the economy." Havana devotes significant
resources to building new tourist facilities and renovating historic structures for use in the tourism
sector. Cuban officials estimate roughly 1.6 million tourists visited Cuba in 1999, with about $1.9
billion in gross revenues. The official projections for 2000 are only slightly higher than in 1999.
Independent analysts and journalists partially attributed low numbers in January to Y2K concerns.
Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Dept. of State, Background Note: Cuba (09/01),
available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/bgn/index.cfm?docid+2886#econ (last visited Nov. 2,
2001).
93. See TRAVIEso-DIAZ PROSPECTIVE, supra note 22, at 2.
94. Hamilton, supra note 89.
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to foreign direct investment. Commentators, including Sornarajah, 5 recognize that the
dependency theory96 has been falling out of favor. As stated by Professor Charles Hill,
whose categorizations of foreign direct investment theories generally mirror those of
Sornarajah, but are titled "the free market view" (cf. classical theory), "the radical view"
(cf dependency theory), and "pragmatic-nationalism" (cf middle path):
By the end of the 1980s; however, the radical position was in retreat almost everywhere. There
seem to be three reasons for this: (1) the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe; (2) the
generally abysmal economic performance of those countries that embraced the radical posi-
tion, and a growing belief by many of these countries that FDI can be an important source of
technology and jobs, and can stimulate economic growth; and (3) the strong economic per-
formance of those developing countries that embraced capitalism rather than radical ideology
(e.g., Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan). 97
The loss of Soviet subsidies and Cuba's failure to develop a flourishing self-sufficient
economy (as contrasted to the benefits reaped by Cuba's neighboring countries that
sought foreign investment),9" forced Cuba to look at outside capital investment as a way
to bolster its economy and improve the lives of its citizens. The benefits of foreign direct
investment to Cuba, 99 as recognized under the pragmatic-nationalism/middle path and
95. "But, even within Latin America, the attraction of the theory seems spent at the present
time." SORNARAJAH, supra note 8, at 44.
96. As discussed supra Part II, the dependency/radical view of foreign direct investment found its
roots in Marxism. See HILL, supra note 6, at 208 ("The radical view traces its roots to Marxist
political and economic theory. Radical writers argue that the multinational enterprise (MNE)
is an instrument of imperialist domination. They see the MNE as a tool for exploiting host
countries to the exclusive benefit of their capitalist-imperialist home countries."). See also
SORNARAJAH, supra note 8, at 44-45 ("Dependency theorists see economic development not
in terms of flow of resources to the host state, but as involving the meaningful distribution
of wealth to the people of the state... . [Tjhere cannot be development until the people as
a whole are freed from poverty and exploitation. Development becomes a right of the people
rather than that of the state."
97. HILL, supra note 6, at 209.
98. "The increasingly powerful trend towards economic globalization has produced a massive
rise in world FDI flows. Latin America and the Caribbean have not been by-passed by
this phenomenon, largely because countries in the region have reoriented their development
policies to stress trade and investment liberalization, market deregulation, and the key role of
the private sector." INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK AND INSTITUTE FOR EUROPEAN-
LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA IN THE 1990s
1 (1996) (recognizing at page 27 that capital flows into Latin America between 1991-1994
averaged U.S. $53 billion per year).
99. It should be noted, that while foreign direct investment can arguably benefit Cuba and its
people, investment opportunities, and a stable economic regime must exist to inspire foreign
investment in Cuba. This was aptly demonstrated by the fact that Law 50 failed to incite
investment in Cuba due to its limitations on private property ownership and controlling
interests in Cuban corporate entities. See discussion supra Part III. See also TRAVIEso-DIAz
PROSPECTIVE, supra note 22, at 5 (setting forth a checklist of "Cuba's minimum economic
and political changes" for investment by American business interests).
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free-market/classical theories, are varied and potentially include:' °
(1) Increased supplies of capital and hard currency.
(2) Technological improvement of the manufacturing process, and in turn,
improved technological goods being made available to Cuban citizens at a
better price.
(3) New jobs as foreign investors hire Cuban workers in newly established ventures.
(4) Management and technical training for Cuban employees.
(5) Improvement of the Cuban balance of payment situation."'
Foreign direct investment is also directly affected by the actions of an investor's
home country. By prohibiting investment in Cuba, the United States is using a pressuring
tactic that runs counter to its policy of generally permitting the export of investment
capital.' O2 Moreover, the ability of the United States to implement/continue a successful
embargo is less effective now than in the early 1960s, when the United States could
better exert its dominant economic world power. "What structural trends show is a gen-
eral decline in American capacity to influence and in opportunities to wield embargoes
effectively."'0 3
While U.S. investment prohibitions remain in place, U.S. business interests are not
afforded the chance to take advantage of what they deem to be positive investment
opportunities in Cuba, the Cuban people are denied the benefits and growth likely to
accompany the investment, and the United States loses the ability to encourage the
workings of the invisible economic hand (as understood to operate under the free market
theory). Moreover, the chilling effect the Helms-Burton Act has had on non-United
States international investment in Cuba, hampers the benefits of foreign direct investment
and, arguably, permits the socialist regime to continue tempting the pro-democratization
effects of foreign investment. If investment were permitted to flow into Cuba, the ensuing
empowerment of the Cuban people (as gained through better jobs, access to hard dollars,
and the availability of choices in the marketplace) has the potential to inspire democratic
reform not produced by the embargo and investment prohibition.
100. See generally, HILL, supra note 6, at 213-218.
101. "A country's balance of payments accounts keep track of both its payments to and its receipts
from other countries.' HILL, supra note 6 at 215.
102. See discussion supra endnote 12.
103. RICHARD J. ELLINGS, EMBARGOES AND WORLD POWER: LESSONS FROM AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY 60 (1985). Ellings goes on to state:
Yet relative to its position in 1950 or 1960, or even 1970, the U.S. faces a more intractable, competi-
tive global environment. There is greater complexity and power at the lower ends of the international
hierarchy-from political as well as economic and military development. . . . In short, the U.S.
supplies smaller proportions of the world's intake of order-keeping, and especially economic goods
and services. Its bargaining position versus other states has weakened. At the same time, the gen-
eral level of global interdependence seems to have risen, especially in regard to integration of the
American economy. As the U.S. declined relative to others, it became more subject to the vagaries
of the international economy.
Id. at 59-60.
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VII. Proposals for Amending the Ban Imposed by the United
States on Foreign Investment in Cuba
Investment restrictions by the United States need to be revamped or even lifted.
More than forty years after Castro's government took power and nationalized property
in Cuba, his government remains in control, and U.S. property owners suffering through
expropriation have not received compensation. Although difficult to accept, it is unlikely
that full compensation will come directly from Cuba. By continuing its policy of pro-
hibiting U.S. nationals from investing in Cuba, and by chilling investment in Cuba from
foreign interests through the Helms-Burton Act, the United States continues to ineffec-
tively utilize significant resources of political and economic capital. Finally, even though
one purpose of the embargo (and resulting investment prohibition) is to pressure the
Marxist government of Cuba out of power, economic theory, backed by anecdotal evi-
dence from Eastern Europe, suggests that permitting the flow of foreign investment into
Cuba is more likely to lead to this ultimate purpose, than preventing direct investment
funds from reaching Cuba.
Even in the face of the strictures of the Helms-Burton Act, it cannot be forgotten
that U.S. law states one policy goal with regard to Cuba is "to be prepared to reduce
sanctions in carefully calibrated ways in response to positive developments in Cuba."04
As discussed above, Cuba now permits direct investment and the ownership of private
property by foreigners. Cuba has also made diplomatic overtures indicating its willing-
ness to negotiate the provision of reparations to individuals and businesses that had
property expropriated. These are positive developments, and arguably an increase in the
flow of foreign direct investment in Cuba will create opportunities for its people. By
amending its law to permit investment in Cuba, moreover, the United States could speed
the crumbling of Communism in Cuba (as was seen in the former Soviet Bloc after the
announcement of Perestroika).
The ban on foreign direct investment in Cuba is a politically charged issue. Policy-
makers in the United States are faced with the cold-war remains of a Socialist dictatorship
off their southeastern coast that has been criticized for the treatment of its citizens,'
and that has nationalized property of U.S. citizens without compensation. This represents
a political, moral, and economic situation that lent itself to tough action. Policymakers,
however, also are hearing the call to open up investment in Cuba in an effort to (1)
permit the invisible hand of capitalism to stir the people of Cuba to a better standard of
living,0 6 and (2) allow U.S. investors a toe-hold in a Cuban economy which will likely
change upon the end of Fidel Castro's leadership.
104. 22 U.S.C.A. § 6002(7).
105. See generally Helms-Burton Act. "The United Nations Commission on Human Rights has
repeatedly reported on the unacceptable human rights situation in Cuba, and has taken the
extraordinary step of appointing a Special Rapporteur." Id. § 6021(20).
106. As stated by Travieso-Diaz:
Those who have studied processes in other countries, similar to the one Cuba is undergoing, predict
that Cuba's ongoing 'Socialist transition' is doomed to fail. As the Hungarian analyst Janos Kornai
has pointed out, a Socialist system is incapable of moving away from its rigid economic structure,
while at the same time retaining its Socialist character. .. . According to Kornai, the rise of the
private sector is the most important internal development that brings out the contradictions in a
Socialist system, and ultimately, causes its involuntary transition into a market economy. A rise in
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The Helms-Burton Act, while raising international objections, has served to become
a hindrance to positive relations between the United States and Cuba. By passing the
act, the United States statutorily indicated that it would continue investment restrictions
until Cuba's government was replaced. From the perspective of the Cuban leadership,
this is an ultimatum to which they cannot willingly accede. However, should the trigger
for investment permissibility be amended, both sides can save face and investment can
resume.
Because it may be impractical and politically difficult to quickly repeal the Helms-
Burton Act and its extraterritorial aspects, the best possible way to come up with a
mutually acceptable solution is to devise a package of concessions. The United States is
in a position to negotiate with Cuba now that the island nation is actively seeking for-
eign direct investment. Possible approaches to ending the investment prohibition include
amending the Helms-Burton Act to: (1) permit investment upon Cuba's implementation
of certain employment standards and job opportunities; (2) adopt a tiered approach to
investment, whereby investment rights would initially be permitted to persons who had
their property expropriated by Cuba in 1959 and 1960, before investment in Cuba is
opened to all U.S. nationals; (3) allow for the negotiation of a discounted compensation
schedule for the owners of expropriated property based upon the recent Cuban diplo-
matic proposal; and (4) promote the creation of an international claims tribunal, where,
upon Cuba's agreement to permit internationally certified claimants the right to repur-
chase expropriated property, investment restrictions will be lifted. The goal behind each
possible amendment to the Helms-Burton Act is to see the complete lifting of investment
restrictions at the earliest possible date. Each approach is discussed below along with
identified questions that will have to be addressed for investment between the United
States and Cuba to resume.
A. BARGAIN FOR CUBAN CONCESSIONS ON EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS
AND JOB OPPORTUNITIES
From a humanitarian point of view, the United States is in a position to negotiate
the reintroduction of investment in a way that will meet several of its policy objectives.
Initially, the United States can requalify its investment policies upon terms that are
intended to assist the average Cuban national be paid in hard currency, while working
in a less regulated environment. Negotiating such a position will not be easy, and will
the private sector is beginning to occur in Cuba, although private property rights still have not
been fully extended to Cuban nationals. This rise in the private sector has been acknowledged
by the government as matter of concern. There is official recognition that a new class of dollar-
rich entrepreneurs, operating at the margin of the state structures, has been created, and that this
new class represents a threat to the Socialist establishment. Thus, it appears that Cuba's Socialist
transition is slowly, and quite unwillingly, creating the conditions for real changes to occur, although
the government is resisting the process as much as it can.
TRAVIESO-DIAZ PROSPECTIVE, supra note 22, at 4 (citations omitted).
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require the Cuban government to assume a Perestroika-like approach to investment
activities 107
Under Law 77, foreign investors must contract for Cuban employees with a state
employment agency.' Particularly with regard to joint ventures, the "Ministry of Labor
and Social Security provides the labor regime."' 9 Through this sub-contracting agree-
ment, the Cuban worker never sees the true fruits of his or her labors:
Currently, foreign companies are required to pay the employing agency in convertible pesos,
which works out to USD $1 per peso, in addition to 25 percent of salary to pay for social
costs. However, the employing entity pays the salaries of employees in non-convertible pesos
which are worth approximately 20 pesos to USD $1. As a result, a foreign employer may be
paying USD $500 per month for an employee, when that employee is receiving the equivalent
of USD $20 per month."0
The U.S. State Department has made statements opposing this practice and has
called on foreign investors already in Cuba to "lobby the Cuban government to end
the unfair practice of requiring foreign firms to pay hundreds of dollars per month for
Cuban workers whom the State... pays only 5-10 percent of that amount in pesos.""
By making the next step and letting it be known that investment dollars will be permitted
to flow into Cuba in partial exchange for direct employment opportunities with hard
dollar wages, the United States could assist the Cuban people and allow them access to
hard currency.
Amending the Helms-Burton Act to permit the resumption of investment if Cuban
employees can be hired directly and paid with hard currency, will potentially serve the
goals of both Cuban and U.S. politicians." 2 The Cuban government will be able to claim
107. By insisting on hard currency wages and direct employment of Cuban workers involved in
commercial activities funded by foreign investment, the United States policymakers will be
able to analogize this situation with the cracking of the Berlin Wall as they appeal to their
political bases. Arguably, if true economic incentives are available to growing numbers of
Cuban nationals, the communist political ideology may be overrun by economic pragmatism
in a relatively short period of time.
108. See Gallousis, supra note 19, at 95 (citing Law 77, Ch. 11 arts. 31 & 34).
109. Rivero, supra note 29, at 80 (citing Cuban Resolution 3/96 in response to Question 4.2 asking:
"Must certain positions... be held by Cuban nationals?").
110. Alison Lacy & Alfred Avanessy, INVESTING IN CUBA 8 (July 2001) (unpublished manuscript on
file with author) (citing Cuba: A Guide for Canadian Businesses, available at http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/geo/htmldocuments/cuba-e.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2001).
Ill. John R. Hamilton, Cuba: Economic Transition and U.S. Policy-Remarks on March 25, 1999,
available at http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/us-cuba/hamil25.htm (last visited Oct. 4, 2001)
(stating, "[C]hange in Cuba is inevitable. The current regime has flaws so profound that it is
hard to imagine how it can endure. It is hard to predict when or how this change will occur.
... We also believe that there is a sense in Cuba, and in the international community, that
the beginning of the end of the regime is approaching.').
112. Admittedly, such an amendment conceivably will not be written in the space of a few para-
graphs. Any amendment will have to qualify the terms upon which the investment will be
permitted by addressing factors that include: the potential tax structures Cuba could imple-
ment to restrict Cuban citizens' access to hard currency, qualifications on employment that
Cuban legislation might try to implement, and restrictions on the ability to spend hard
currency in Cuba.
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that it negotiated a huge concession from the United States, while at the same time
opening a currently untapped source of investment funds. The U.S. government will be
able to put hard currency directly in the hands of Cuban workers, promote the working
of the invisible economic hand (and the subsequent move towards democratization),
and permit its nationals to establish their business interests in Cuba before the eventual
fall of the Castro regime.
This proposal does not address the lack of compensation to U.S. nationals who had
assets expropriated, which initially served as the impetus for the investment prohibi-
tion. U.S. officials might be willing to move forward in permitting investment without
addressing this situation, due to the unlikelihood that full compensation will be forth-
coming; however, it might also be that policymakers can implement the amendment
process in conjunction with permitting either the tiered investment approach, or an
amended compensation schedule, as discussed in the following subsections.
B. PERMIT INVESTMENT IN A TIERED FASHION
It is becoming less and less likely that Cuba will ever pay adequate and effective
compensation to those U.S. nationals who had property expropriated during 1959-1960.
This does not mean, however, that claims of these individuals are worthless. Conceivably,
the holders of these claims can be granted some rights that, although not equivalent to
adequate compensation, provide some otherwise nonexistent relief.
A possible way of granting such rights is the creation of a one-year transition period
during which persons, whether or not U.S. citizens,"1 3 who had property expropriated
would be given the exclusive right, via an exception to the Helms-Burton Act, to directly
invest in Cuba. Under such a scenario, investment amounts should be determined by an
arbitrary formula. Utilizing the damages provision of the Helms-Burton Act, this amount
can be limited to three times the losses suffered, as certified by the Foreign Claims Settle-
ment Commission.1 4 Following this one-year period of restricted investment, investment
would be opened to everyone.
Creating a one-year investment window" 5 exclusively for the benefit of those who
had property expropriated serves to allow them a first in advantage. The proposal repre-
sents a politically expedient way of addressing the compensation issue, while realistically
acknowledging the unlikelihood of full compensation. Additionally, if the investment
rights exemption is made freely salable and transferable, a potential income source is
created that theoretically could provide some compensation.1 '6
113. Effectively, due to the fact that most of the foreign-held expropriated assets were owned by
U.S. nationals, most early-entrants under this proposal will be U.S. nationals. However, by not
making this exclusion to the Helms-Burton Act only available to U.S. nationals, the United
States may be able to avoid some of the negative international reaction that was received
upon passage of the Helms-Burton Act, which has extraterritorial reach under its current
form.
114. See 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a).
115. The one-year period set forth in this proposal was arbitrarily selected. While any eventual
period of time utilized should be long enough to permit an advantage, it should not be so
long as to chill investment by subsequent investors.
116. The potential exists for a market to develop in the buying of investment rights by those who
want early entrance into Cuba from those who have the right to enter.
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The proposal of a tiered investment process is placed on the discussion table with
the understanding that political, economic, and legal issues will have to be overcome.
On a political front, the tiered approach permits an increased flow of investment cap-
ital into Cuba with the hope that economic choices will eventually lead to a true self-
determination by the Cuban people of their leadership. This reopening of the investment
spout should only occur if assurances can be received that the economic benefit will
flow directly to the Cuban people (and not be siphoned off directly by a government
struggling to put its hands on hard currency). Thus, as discussed in the preceding sub-
section, the Helms-Burton Act should be used to serve as a bargaining chip in diplomatic
negotiations to ensure certain economic rights for the Cuban people." 7
On an economic front, will persons granted early investment rights in Cuba actually
invest? Although a doctoral thesis could easily be written on this question, the answer
comes down to the value that is created by being an early entrant into a developing
market. As alluded to by Matias Travieso-Diaz in the introduction to his book, The
Laws and Legal System of a Free-Market Cuba-A Prospective for Business, a'business
executive who is permitted to invest in Cuba, may delay investing, despite a desire to do
so, until obstacles other than the embargo (such as the existence of a Socialist state and
the uncertain investment protections available under the developing Cuban legal system)
are removed."' On the other hand, if privatizations should occur within the timeframe
of the tiered investment period, then those persons with the right to invest in Cuba
will have a clear advantage at being the first to bid. If privatization should occur after
the tiered investment period ends, those persons with the strongest economic ties and
operational base within Cuba, will arguably have an advantage gaining a share of the
privatized company. This also may inspire those holding early-entrant rights to invest.
On a legal front, the United States can expect that arguments will be raised, both by
U.S. nationals and foreign states, alleging that opening investment in a tiered manner is
commercially discriminatory to those who did not suffer from expropriation. Nationally,
Congress can address potential lawsuits from U.S. citizens not entitled to early entry to
Cuban investment by demonstrating, through statutory findings, that compelling justi-
fications are present to implement the one-year window of restricted investment. Inter-
nationally, the chilling effects of the Helms-Burton Act will have to be restricted (i.e., by
amending Titles III and IV) to limit the arguments against extraterritorial overreaching.
C. NEGOTIATE A DISCOUNTED COMPENSATION SCHEDULE FOR THE
OWNERS OF EXPROPRIATED PROPERTY
For a third proposal, the Helms-Burton Act also could be amended, based on the
recent Cuban proposal for negotiations, to permit investment following the creation of
a discounted schedule to compensate the owners of expropriated property. As previously
discussed, in November of 2001, Cuba's Minister of Foreign Affairs announced to the
United Nations that Cuba recognizes the compensation rights of those who had prop-
erty expropriated by the Cuban government." 9 Additionally, Cuba indicated that it is
117. See discussion supra Part VIla.
118. See TRAVIEso-DIAz PROSPECTIVE, supra note 22, at introduction.
119. See Statement Delivered by H.E. Mr. Felipe Pgrez Roque, supra note 4.
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now "willing to reach an agreement [on compensation] that also takes into account the
extremely burdensome economic and human hardships inflicted on [Cuba] by the block-
ade.' '" 2' By framing potential negotiations in this way, Cuba appears to desire reaching a
settlement, of sorts, which credits Cuba with a monetary value for the hardship suffered
during the embargo over the last four decades. This hardship credit would then be used
by Cuba as a set-off to diminish actual monetary compensation paid to U.S. nationals.
The diplomatic rhetoric is not noteworthy in how it is proposed, but rather is impor-
tant because it was proposed. Obviously, an U.S. politician would gain little by agreeing
to the proposal as made. However, seizing upon the concession that U.S. interests are
entitled to compensation, it is conceivable that a discounted compensation schedule can
be reached (via the application of a compensation ratio)' 2' in order to place actual
money in the hands of those who had property expropriated.
As has been discussed, the potential for adequate and effective individual compensa-
tion has diminished with time, so the negotiation of any substantial compensation, even
if discounted, should be welcomed. Nay-Sayers will correctly raise the point that Cuba
should not be rewarded with a discounted compensation schedule after illegally refusing
to pay compensation for over forty years. As such, any ultimate compensation schedule
should be aggressively negotiated to ensure that compensation is substantial, and takes
into account that recompense has illegally been withheld for a substantial time. Even
so, negotiators must not forget that U.S. interests are being harmed by the investment
restrictions currently in place, and that a substantive compensation arrangement, even
if not full compensation, is better than nothing.
Although this option can be attacked because it potentially rewards Cuban actions
via a discounted compensation schedule, direct negotiations may prove the least burden-
some method by which investors who had property expropriated can be compensated,
while at the same time prove to be the quickest method for reopening investment oppor-
tunities in Cuba. As such, diplomatic efforts to seize upon the apparent invitation by
Cuba to enter into negotiations appear to be worthwhile.
D. NEGOTIATE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS
TRIBUNAL WITH AN ACCOMPANYING RIGHT TO REPURCHASE PROPERTY
Should negotiations for an actual compensation ratio for expropriation claims prove
unsuccessful, the Helms-Burton Act also could be amended to permit investment in
Cuba after the establishment of an international claims tribunal, the jurisdiction of which
is agreed to by Cuba. The establishment of a claims tribunal to establish the validity
and amount of individual claims has historical precedence,' 22 and the independence of
120. Id.
121. As conceived, it appears the compensation ratio would be applied to an agreed property
value. As discussed supra Part VIld, an international claims tribunal could be utilized to
determine property values, if the Cuban government is not satisfied with the values/losses
certified by the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission. See discussion supra endnote 77.
122. For example, international claims tribunals have been established to address individual prop-
erty claims giving rise to diplomatic tension between the following countries: Mexico and
United States (Mexican expropriation of property-tribunal established 1923); Iran and
United States (Iranian seizure of property-tribunal established 1981); Canada and United
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the tribunal would serve to dissuade Cuba's concerns that U.S. evaluations of property
claims are self-serving.'23
As envisioned by the author, the claims tribunal would, over a set period of time,
certify the claims brought by persons who had property expropriated. Once the claim is
certified, the claimant would be given the right to repurchase the expropriated property
from the Cuban government at a predetermined percentage of the fair market value
(as also certified by the claims tribunal).' 24 If the claimed property is no longer held
by the Cuban government, then Cuba may either substitute like property (approved by
the tribunal), for which no claim has been made, or pay the claimant a cash award
equivalent to the "spread" that would have existed between the purchase price and fair
market value, had the claimant been able to purchase the property.
The determination of the percentage of fair market value that the claimant will have
to pay for the right to reclaim property will ultimately be a matter of negotiation, but it
should be established prior to the creation of the claims tribunal. The percentage should
be low enough to give the purchaser an immediate form of compensation through the
difference between the asset value and the price paid. The percentage, however, should
not be so high as to send the Cuban economy into a downward spiral. A percentage of
65 percent of fair market value might be an appropriate starting place in the diplomatic
negotiations. If handled properly, the potential exists for a flood of capital to be placed
in the Cuban treasury through this privatization process.
This proposal has the benefit of avoiding the discriminatory application of invest-
ment opportunities associated with the second proposal, but it does require additional
compliance by Cuba, which to this point has not been forthcoming. Cuba, under this
proposal, will have to face the privatization of governmental property in a manner that
States (Claims relating to Gut Dam-tribunal established 1956); Venezuela and United States
(Venezuelan seizure of property-arbitration panel established 1906). See Brian F. Havel,
The Constitution in an Era of Supranational Adjudication, 78 N.C. L. REV. 257, 268 n. 32
(2000) (discussing Claims Commissions between the United States and Mexico, and the Iran-
U.S. Claims Tribunal, and further recognizing these tribunals "were truly ad hoc in nature,
forming a closed and predictable set of litigants, timeframes, and causes, so that the limits
of jurisdiction ratione personae, ratione temporae, and ratione materiae were always fixed
and ascertainable"); Jeff Nemerofsky, Litvinov Lives? U.S. Investors May be Playing Russian
Roulette, 8 MIcH. ST. U.-DET. C.L. J. INT'L L. 487, 495-96 (1999) (discussing International
Arbitral Tribunal to Dispose of United States Claims Relating to Gut Dam between Canada
and the United States, the Submission to Arbitration of All Unsettled Claims of Citizens of
the United States of America Against the Republic of Venezuela, and the Iran-U.S. Claims
Tribunal). See also Rosemary E. Libera, Note, Divide, Conquer, and Pay: Civil Compensation
for Wartime Damages, 24 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 291 (2001) (discussing the multilateral,
but non-adversarial claims settlement functions of the United Nations Compensation Com-
mission, created to compensate those suffering damages as a result of Iraq's actions during
the Persian Gulf War).
123. To date, the validity of claims have been determined at Congressional direction by the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission. See discussion supra endnote 77.
124. This, of course, assumes the Cuban government is not willing to pay actual monetary com-
pensation, or has failed to agree to a discounted compensation, schedule. See discussion supra
Part Vllc.
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contradicts the Socialist underpinnings of the government. As such, Cuba's government
realistically might not accept this proposal until the current leadership is replaced.
The proposal should not be dismissed out of hand, however, since by amending
the Helms-Burton Act with an eye toward multilateral involvement in the compensation
effort, the current splintered approach taken by the nations of the world as to Cuba can
be refocused into pressuring Cuba to comply with some sort of compensation scheme.
VIII. Conclusion
The investment relationship between Cuba and the United States is complicated
and covers periods of extreme tension. Unfortunately, the forty-plus year investment
prohibition has failed to bring compensation to those who had property expropriated,
has failed to bring democratic reform to Cuba, and has failed to pressure Castro out of
power.
Even though the investment restrictions initially implemented by the United States
in response to massive property expropriations may have been justified forty years ago,
the time has arrived for the United States to realize that the harm caused by investment
restrictions to the United States and Cuba outweigh any benefits that might be gained.
Cuba has now moved from the radical approach of foreign investment to a much more
mainstream approach, further justifying the cessation of investment restrictions.
The United States should resume a policy aimed at permitting investment by its
nationals in Cuba. Such investment should speed up the reforms that the embargo
and investment prohibition have failed to bring about. Unfortunately, the existence of
the Helms-Burton Act in its current form makes a pro-investment policy unworkable,
thus the act should be amended. An amended version of the Helms Burton Act can be
used to try and bring economic reform to the people of Cuba along, with some form
of compensation or acknowledged legal rights to those who will likely never receive
adequate or effective compensation for expropriated property, due to the passage of time.
This paper was written with the intent of promoting a discussion on the possibilities
for reinstituting investment relations between the United States and Cuba, not to set
forth a definitive plan. As the reader noticed, while reviewing the four proposals set
out in Part VII, the issues to be approached are difficult, and possible solutions raise
additional questions. Even so, Cuba is now indicating a willingness to enter into serious
negotiations, and this opportunity should be seized so that foreign direct investment in
Cuba may soon resume.

